This paper provides what we believe to be the first empirical test of whether investors in the foreign exchange market are uncertainty averse. We do this using a heterogeneous agents model in which fundamentalist and chartist beliefs of the exchange rate co-exist and are allowed to be either uncertainty neutral or uncertainty averse. Uncertainty aversion is modelled using the maxmin expected utility approach. We find significant evidence of uncertainty aversion in the FX market where in particular fundamentalists are found to be largely uncertainty neutral while chartists are mainly uncertainty averse. Inclusion of uncertainty averse agents significantly improves the performance of the model.
Introduction
Foreign exchange theory and modelling has been in a state of turmoil since Meese and Rogoff (1983) demonstrated that standard theoretical models, of that time, could not outperform a random walk in out-of-sample prediction. The problem is that a random walk can only represent an efficient price if the expected equilibrium exchange rate were to be constant and for many reasons, in a risk averse world, this is an unacceptable position to take. Theory implies that the expected equilibrium rate varies over time to reflect, amongst other factors, time varying risk premia which should imply a degree of predictability. Standard foreign exchange models developed within the rational representative agent framework appear therefore to be dominated by a simple random walk model that is itself seen to be invalid.
Despite considerable research in the intervening 25 years no consensus theoretical paradigm has been developed to resolve the paradox raised by Meese and Rogoff. A recent detailed analysis by Della Corte, Sarno and Tsiakas (2008) concludes, following a Bayesian Model Averaging exercise, that fundamentals are important but a variety of different models may be relevant to explain behaviour in foreign exchange markets. We believe a new theoretical paradigm may be needed to explain these results -one which removes the representative agent paradigm and addresses uncertainty as opposed to risk in financial markets. This paper represents the first attempts to bring these two concepts to bear in order to explain observed movements in foreign exchange rates.
Finance theory has traditionally been based on an analysis of Risk, measured using some aspect of a distribution which is assumed to be unique and characterises returns. However a growing body of research has argued that one reason why the standard model, based on expected utility theory, fails to explain many "anomalies" and stylised facts observed across financial markets may be because agents in these markets face Uncertainty as opposed to Risk, as originally suggested by Knight (1921) and Keynes (1921) . Bewley (2002) makes the distinction between Risk and Uncertainty in the following way; " a random variable is risky if its probability distribution is known, uncertain if its distribution is unknown". Market traders may simply not know which of several potential distributions to apply to evaluate an uncertain prospect or alternatively be faced with a situation in which they have no prior experience and hence have no distribution at all to call on to carry out their risk calculus. The required probabilities may therefore either be unknown or unmeasurable. As argued by Keynes and Knight the Uncertainty framework may in fact better represent decision making in financial markets than the classic Risk paradigm where agents are assumed not to doubt their models and in particular the associated probability distributions.
A number of authors have developed theories of decision-making under uncertainty including Schmeidler (1989) , Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , Quiggin (1982) , and Epstein and Wang (1994) , Uppal and Wang (2003) , Maenhout (2004) 1 In this paper we provide what we believe to be the first formal empirical test of uncertainty aversion within traders in an FX market.
One obstacle is that virtually all models of decision-making under uncertainty in finance and foreign exchange rate theory are representative agent models and this seems in direct contrast with simple observation of all financial markets which to construct the multiple prior set which then reflects the degree of uncertainty or the range of potential models that might explain behaviour in foreign exchange markets. The "extreme" event in this set may in fact be local to the null model depending on how the prior set is drawn up. We assume that the investor is then faced with forming expectations regarding future exchange rates and considers the worst outcome within this set of models or effectively some interval, where the width of the interval is a subjective choice of the investor and hence is able to capture different degrees of uncertainty aversion. Using the Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) and nonlinear least squares methods we then estimate the model and test whether this critical parameter (the width) is significantly different from zero and hence whether uncertainty aversion exists in the foreign exchange market.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a description of the model. In Section 2 we outline the Unscented Kalman filter, used here as a method of state estimation and then parameter estimation by the nonlinear least squares.
Section 3 contains the estimation results and model evaluation including specification tests relating to the model. The discussion and interpretation of the results is given in Section 4. Finally we provide some concluding remarks in Section 5.
Heterogeneous Agent Model
We assume that there are two currencies -domestic and foreign which are traded on the foreign exchange market. Denote by s t the foreign exchange rate at time tthe price of one unit of foreign currency in units of domestic currency. There are N investors competing by trading in the market. Let ρ t be the interest rate relevant to the foreign currency and r t be the interest rate for the domestic country over the period t.
An agent's wealth at time t is determined by his trading activity and is equal to
where d t and f t denote trader's demands on domestic and foreign currency respectively held at time t. The individual's demands must satisfy the budget constraint
There are two types of investor: fundamentalists and what we will call chartists but really these are defined by the tools they use to form expectations. The former believe that there exists an equilibrium price (fundamental value)s t towards which the exchange rate will always move. More precisely, their expectation of the change in the exchange rate is proportional to the observed difference between the fundamental value and the previous level of the exchange rate and is expressed by the formula
where expectations are calculated conditional on the information available at time t. We discuss below in Subsection 1.4 how the values is determined.
We assume chartists use a simple long-short moving average rule in order to predict a future deviation from its past level. Their exchange rate forecast is then
given by 
Demand functions
We identify four different individual demand functions which determine the market clearing exchange rate. In particular, f 
Uncertainty neutral agents
Agents' risk preferences are characterised by a quadratic utility function U (x) = x − γx 2 , where we assume that the risk-aversion coefficient γ is the same for all traders. Let an uncertainty neutral agent decide to hold f n t foreign currency units at time t. Then, any uncertainty-neutral investor maximises the quadratic expected utility function of the next-period wealth
The agent's wealth at the next period t + 1 is given by
Maximising the expected utility of the next period's wealth with respect to f i,n t , domestic agents are able to determine their optimal trade, which is given in the following theorem. 
See Appendix for the proof.
Uncertainty averse agents
Uncertainty averse agents maximise their maxmin quadratic expected utility function of future wealth (see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , Garlappi et al. (2004) ).
Their preferences are expressed by the set of possible future expected values of the exchange rate determined by a (symmetric) bandwidth δ I around the base or uncertainty neutral expectation. That is, an uncertainty averse domestic agent assumes that the future exchange rate takes its value in the interval [
The maximisation problem of such an agent can be written as follows:
with respect to budget constraint
Let us denote 
See the Appendix for the proof.
Learning through social interaction
Consistent with observed behaviour in the markets investors may change the way they make their decisions at every period of time, as discussed in Menkhoff and Tay At the beginning of period t agents compare the realised utilities of the different strategies and invest into those which perform better. To be more precise, each trader chooses a strategy in a probabilistic manner where the probability of choosing a strategy depends on its past performance. According to this model the probability of an investor becoming a fundamentalist at time t can be calculated as
where G t (F ) and G t (C) are discounted sums of the one-period utilities of the fundamentalists and chartists respectively given that both types of agent had the same initial level of wealth. That is,
The parameter β here is called the intensity of choice (see Boswijk et al. (2007) ) and ω plays the role of a discount factor.
Simultaneously with changing the method of expectation formation, a trader can change his reaction to the level of uncertainty present in the market. Sentiment indicators are frequently found to be significant in explaining asset returns which reflects the time varying nature of uncertainty in markets. If, based on the past performance an uncertainty averse strategy appears better in terms of utility than being uncertainty neutral, traders will become more careful and less aggressive as specified by the maxmin model. If the information available in the market is treated as "certain", then agents will be more willing to choose a simple expected utility strategy. Under severe uncertainty the maxmin strategy can be as bad as a "do nothing" strategy while under mild uncertainty it will earn some positive utility and will be less sensitive to bad outcomes. In the same way the probability of an investor becoming uncertainty neutral is obtained from the formula
, where G n t (I) and G u t (I) are discounted sums of the one-period utilities of corresponding uncertainty neutral and uncertainty averse strategies respectively. This learning mechanism ensures that strategies with higher realised utility in the recent past become more attractive to agents. In this way, traders do not systematically make mistakes but learn about the strategy with the highest current performance.
The Market Clearing Exchange Rate
In order to be able to define the aggregate demand functions we denote the proportion of fundamentalists in the market by x t and let y These proportions will change with time according to the probabilities specified above.
As we can see each individual demand function is a function of the expected value of the level of the foreign exchange rate s t . Depending on past information an investor decides how to build his expectation: based on fundamental variables or by inferring structure from historical exchange rate patterns (or in other words -be fundamentalist or chartist). Let us denote by Φ t (s t ) the aggregate demand function at time t.
These demand functions can be presented in the form
The market clearing exchange rate s * t is then a solution of the market clearing equation
that is, the aggregate demand must be equal to aggregate supply which is held at 0 for simplicity. We denote the pricing function byf (
, where F t is the information available it time t. If the function Φ is not invertible, we can treat f as a generalised inverse considering the solution that minimises Φ (the distance minimising solution).
The Fundamental Exchange Rate
Fundamentalists are assumed to form their beliefs about the latent fundamental equilibrium exchange rate,s t , based on the Uncovered Interest Parity Condition.
They believe that log(s t ) = log(s t−1 ) + log(r t−1 ) − log(ρ t−1 ). Notice that UIP is only used to determine the latent equilibrium exchange rate since it is well known that market rates fail to satisfy the UIP condition. In fact, our model could provide one explanation for the existence of the carry trade through the presence of uncertainty averse heterogeneous agents in the market. Since the fundamental exchange rate is unobservable, fundamentalists are assumed to use a state space estimation method to form their estimation ofs. As in the Standard Kalman Filter they form prior beliefs and use a Bayesian rule to update these beliefs but because of out model is nonlinear we have to move beyond the simple Kalman Filter. Fundamentalists are rational in the way they take into account both fundamental information and the presence of chartists in the market. They use this information to derive the posterior distribution of the fundamental price from which the optimal state estimate can be derived. This estimate is then used together with realised exchange rates when forming their expectations of the market rate through equation (1.1) and their demands which in turn to determine the market rate along with chartist demands.
Assuming a gaussian error term, the expression for the fundamental prices t will be log(s t ) = log(s t−1 ) + log(r t−1 ) − log(ρ t−1 ) + σsξ t ,
( 1.7) with ξ t ∼ N (0, 1). In the absence of chartists, fundamentalist traders would drive the exchange rate to the fundamental price and it would coincide with the rational expectations equilibrium. Hereafter we use the notations t also to denote the estimate of the fundamental rate where it does not lead to confusion.
Chartists are boundedly rational since while recognising the presence of fundamentalists they choose not to take available fundamental information into account. 
Estimation
We now describe the estimation of the latent fundamental rate and the parameters of the model. Given that the model is highly nonlinear, the Bayesian estimation of the model is performed using an Unscented Kalman Filter, which is described in the following subsection. Having then estimated the fundamental price we use nonlinear least squares to estimate the parameters of the model.
Unscented Kalman Filter
The Van der Merwe (1998).
We are interested in estimating a nonlinear model of the form
where y t ∈ R ny denotes the observable output time series, in our case the level of the market clearing exchange rate, u t ∈ R nu the input data (interest rates and past exchange rates), x t ∈ R nx the unobserved state of the system, in our case the fundamental rate, w t ∈ R nw the process noise and n t ∈ R nn the measurement noise.
The functions f and h are said to represent the state measurement and transition models respectively; (2.1) represents the solution to (1.6) for the observed market clearing exchange rate and (2.2) corresponds to the UIP condition determining the fundamental exchange rate (1.7).
The unscented transformation method directly evaluates the nonlinearities in f and h through a sequential monte carlo simulation and directly calculates the first two moments of x and y from the nonlinear system itself. Let us denote by
T and by x a t|t and P a t|t the mean and covariance of x a at time t. In order to provide a transformation, a set of 2n a + 1 weighted samples of sigma points 
denotes the ith column of the matrix square root of (n a +λ)P a t|t . In our implementation we set κ = 2, α = 0.9, β = 2.
The prediction step of the UKF can be sketched in the following way.
The measurement update equations are as follows:
Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) Estimation
The UKF method allows us to write the model in the form
where y t is the observed time series (exchange rate levels in our case) and ε t are independent identically distributed random variables. The parameters θ ∈ Θ of the model are then estimated (in a distribution free manner) by minimising the sum of squared errors
The generalised nonlinear least squares estimates are asymptotically normally dis-
where Ω = A −1 BA −1 being White-Domowitz robust covariance matrix with
E( y t y t ) and
(see White and Domowitz (1984) for details).
Empirical Results
As we have said the function f in the measurement equation (2.1) solves the market clearing condition (1.6), that is, the measurement equation is s t =f (u t ,s t ) +ε t .
The function h in the state transition equation is in the form of the relation (1.7)
with σsξ t being a noise. Inputs to the system are the interest rates r t and ρ t as well as the past realised prices s t−j , j = 1, ...t − 1.
The proxies we use for the domestic and foreign risk-free rates r and ρ are the UK and US Interbank LIBOR overnight rates respectively and we use daily closing rates on the GBP/USD exchange rate over the period from 2 January 1997 till 30
June 2008, as shown in Figure 1 .
For identification we need to tie down several parameters and since we are more interested in the degree of uncertainty aversion in traders we fix the risk aversion coefficient to be γ = 2. Under the assumption of identical risk aversion for both types of investor, this coefficient in fact has no influence on the equilibrium prices in our model. The set of parameters remaining for estimation then consists of [Insert Table 1 here]
Based on the estimation results we conclude that six of the parameter estimates are significantly different from 0 while δ F is not. These results indicate strong uncertainty aversion in chartists but not fundamentalists since the parameter δ C is significantly different from zero and hence the null hypothesis is rejected. Uncertainty aversion therefore appears to be an important feature of at least some traders in the foreign exchange market. One intuitive interpretation for this result could be as follows; fundamentalists have a strong belief in one economic model and their expectations are tied down by the exogenous interest rates throughs but chartists use an 'ad hoc' time series model driven by past realised rates and hence are naturally more uncertain as to the true model driving the fundamental exchange rate.
The average of uncertainty averse agents in the market is 21.56% which indicates a significant impact on the realised exchange rate.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
In order to test the joint hypothesis of no uncertainty aversion in all traders we specify the null hypothesis that all traders in the market are uncertainty neutral (simply quadratic utility maximisers) by:
with the alternative
We test this hypothesis using Wald test on the restriction δ F = δ C = 0. The corresponding F statistic is computed by
where RSS δ C =δ F =0 (θ 3:7 ) and RSS U (θ) are residual sum of squares of the restricted and unrestricted models andσ 2 is the estimate of the variance of the residuals from the unrestricted model. Estimates of the parameters of the restricted model is given in Table 2 . The value of the test statistic is F = 31.08 which is substantially larger than 1% critical value F 0.01,1,∞ = 6.895. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis of no uncertainty aversion within traders in the FX market.
Model Evaluation
In order for us to have confidence in the test results reported above we need to be sure that the model is a reasonably good representation of reality (although we have used robust standard errors in the inference). We proceed to evaluate the model using three different approaches; first we compute standard residual diagnostic tests, then we compare the model with the random walk model in an out-of-sample prediction exercise and then finally we carry out two further prediction based tests to examine if there is any exploitable structure in the model's output -the PesaranTimmermann test for the directional change predictability and the Anatolyev-Gerko test for economic value based on using the forecasts from the model in a simple trading rule.
Before discussing these results we would like to stress that it is logically impossible to formally validate this model using just aggregate exchange rate data.
4
The model we have built has a complex "micro" structure which leads to an aggregate or macro output in the level of observed exchange rate. We now compare the ability of our model to predict out-of-sample compared to a random walk, following the classic paper by Meese and Rogoff (1983) . We provide several tests on the predictive power of the model in a recursive one step ahead prediction mode in order to gain some form of model evaluation. Anatolyev and Gerko test of no mean predictability, i.e. independence of the past exchange rate returns, is based on both market timing and a trading rule. Essentially this is a Hausman test that compares two estimates of mean returns from a simple trading rule, both of which will be consistent under the null of no predictability but will differ under the alternative (of dependence on past returns). The formal testing procedures are described in the Appendix.
The null hypothesis underlying both Pesaran-Timmermann and the AnatolyevGerko tests is essentially that the predictor from the model again cannot beat a random walk strategy. Rejection means that the model can predict significantly better than the baseline random walk model and hence we would expect it to dominate virtually all the standard macro based models of the exchange rate that were considered by Meese and Rogoff.
Following Kozhan and Salmon (2007), we consider different trading strategies which take into account the presence of uncertainty. We examine predictability of the exchange rate by measuring when the predicted value of the exchange rate deviates from the previous value by more than a given value k. The trading strategy based on the forecast is then to trade only if the forecast value for the next day's exchange rate is larger than the current price level by more than k and not to trade otherwise. The rationale behind this is reflected in a so-called no-trade condition (see Dow and Werlang (1992) ). If a forecast value does not differ from the current level of the exchange rate by more than k, then the trader does not believe that there is a clear enough signal on which to trade, in other words there is too much uncertainty in the market.
[Insert Table 3 here] Table 3 
Discussion and Interpretation
The most important result is that we seem to have found is that at least some traders in the FX market appear to be uncertainty averse. The estimation results
show that the inclusion of uncertainty averse agents improves the performance of the model (through the F test) and the uncertainty aversion parameter for chartists is significantly different from zero. However traders do not remain equally uncertainty averse throughout the sample. As we can see in Figure 2 there are periods of higher and lower uncertainty aversion in the market, but since fundamentalists are uncertainty neutral (as δ F is insignificantly different from zero) these periods are highly correlated with the periods of chartist activity.
[Insert Figure [Insert Figure 4 here]
We can also observe in Figure 4 that even in the absence of clear trends in the exchange rate at the end of November 1999, a large difference between the fundamental rate and the realised exchange rate immediately causes a big drop in the proportion of fundamentalists in the market.
The important observation is that the majority of chartists have been found to be uncertainty averse while the degree of uncertainty aversion among fundamentalists is almost zero. Periods when chartists are more confident in the market (the degree of uncertainty is low) are usually at the end of active chartist periods. The intuition behind this behaviour is that once technical traders become more powerful (their proportion increases) they create trends effectively by their own herding behaviour.
At the same time, as this trend becomes clear chartists become more confident in their predictions. Hence they use point predictors to make money rather than interval-based forecasts which would reflect uncertainty.
The proportion of uncertainty averse chartists is relatively stable over the whole period of time. This is explained by the fact that uncertainty averse traders are prepared for the worst possible outcome and are less sensitive to large negative shocks in the exchange rate. The proportion of uncertainty neutral traders varies over time and depends highly on market conditions.
From the estimation results we see that the parameter δ F which reflects uncertainty aversion of fundamentalist traders is almost zero so we are not able to distinguish the performance of uncertainty neutral fundamentalists from the performance of uncertainty averse fundamentalists, they are essentially the same. So in fact their proportions in the market are identical and for this reason we present all fundamentalists as being uncertainty neutral. If fundamentalists predict the future rate incorrectly and face losses it does not make any difference to them to switch to an uncertainty averse strategy as it will not improve their performance.
Conclusions
In when these trends are long. As soon as any trend breaks down the majority of traders switch back to the fundamentalist strategy.
The approach proposed in the paper has several limitations. Chartists are usually more sophisticated that simply trend followers and therefore their forecasts might be more precise than suggested by the model. This is especially true due to the dramatic increase of algorithmic trading among investors and the use of such techniques as genetic programming. Also, our model has been estimated using daily data while in real markets prices are obviously determined on an tick by tick basis.
Despite these limitations the paper provides a first step to detecting and testing the behavioural attitude of FX traders to uncertainty by providing what may be the first empirical test of. It therefore extends the existing literature of decision making under uncertainty and provides an approach to rigorously examining further models on real data.
We have not discussed the implications of the model for the carry trade but it is clear from the structure of the model that the UIP condition will be violated by the realised market clearing exchange rates for considerable periods of due to the presence of uncertainty averse heterogeneous agents in the market. The trading strategy based on the forecast is to trade only if the forecast value for the next day's exchange rate is larger than the current price level more than k and not to The statement of the lemma can be easily obtained from the previous equation.
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Pesaran-Timmermann Test. Let s t be the realised value of the exchange rate and s t|t−1 -its forecast. Define the probabilities P 11 = P (s t|t−1 < 0, s t < 0), P 12 = P (s t|t−1 < 0, s t ≥ 0), (P ii −P i0P0i ) = 0, which says that the predictor cannot predict significantly more correct directional changes that a random walk predictor (i.e. 50%). Here the probabilities estimateŝ P ij are frequencies of the corresponding events observed in the data.
The test is based on the standardised statistic
where n is the number of observations, and A n estimates the average return from using the trading strategy whereas B n estimates the average return from using the benchmark strategy that issues buy/sell signals randomly with probabilities corresponding to the proportion of buys and sells implied ex post by the trading strategy. When r t is predictable investing in the trading strategy will generate higher returns than the benchmark and the difference between A n and B n will be sizable. The variance of the difference A n − B n is 
